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Abstract 
 
 
When Economic Development was published in 1958, Ireland was a growth failure but thirty 
years later it became the Celtic Tiger.  This paper places this remarkable development in the 
context of long-run economic growth in Western Europe and establishes the distinctive 
features of Irish experience and policy.  This enables an assessment of the diagnosis and 
policy proposals that Whitaker provided fifty years ago.  The central roles in the Celtic Tiger 
of foreign direct investment, ICT production, and an elastic labour supply are highlighted 
while the importance of globalization and the abandonment of misguided autarchic policies is 
made clear. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
When Economic Development was published in 1958 there was good reason to worry both 
about Ireland's economic performance and its economic prospects.  While most western 
European countries were enjoying rapid economic growth Ireland was falling well behind the 
leaders.  With an industrial−relations structure based on strong but de-centralized collective 
bargaining, Ireland was not in a position to follow the corporatist path to rapid catch-up 
growth based on wage restraint in return for high investment which prevailed in much of 
Europe.  As a small, inefficient, and still quite agricultural economy on the periphery, there 
were good reasons to fear the consequences of moves to free trade within Europe. 
 
Fast forward to 2007 and Ireland had overtaken all European economies except Luxembourg 
in terms of real GDP per person and had just emerged from the Celtic Tiger period of 
economic growth.  This phase had seen Ireland take off into a growth trajectory predicated on 
taking up the opportunities of globalization and the ICT era.  Between 1987 and 2007, under 
the auspices of social partnership, real GDP per person grew at 5.6 per cent per year, 
comparable with the fast-growth economies of East Asia and far ahead of any other European 
country. 
 
This paper seeks to place these contrasting experiences firmly in the context of the postwar 
European experience of economic growth.  Obviously, it is important to understand how the 
tortoise achieved metamorphosis into the hare but it is also instructive explicitly to consider 
why Ireland under-performed relative to its European peer group during the Golden Age and 
then out-performed in the late twentieth century.  This will allow some reflections on the 
diagnosis and remedy set out in Economic Development informed also by ideas taken from 
modern growth economics. 
 
2.  Irish Growth in the European Golden Age 
 
The years 1950 to 1973 are conventionally known as the Golden Age of European economic 
growth.  It is important to recognize that this was throughout a period of growth failure for 
Ireland.  By 1973 Ireland had sunk to the bottom of the west European league in terms of the 
level of real GDP per person, below even Greece and Portugal.  Table 1, in which the 
countries are ranked according to the level of real GDP per person in 1950 and which shows 
a strong inverse correlation between initial income and subsequent growth, gives a sense of 
the magnitude of the growth shortfall.  Comparison with Austria and Italy suggests that 
growth of real GDP per person at 5 per cent per year rather than 3 per cent per year was par 
for the course and that the income of level of 1973 might have been at least 50 per cent 
higher. 
 
A further insight into this disappointing growth performance can be obtained using growth 
accounting to examine the sources of Irish labour productivity growth, a technique which is 
particularly useful for benchmarking comparisons across countries.  Table 2 reports results 
from an exercise of this kind carried out by Bosworth and Collins (2003).  Compared with 
other relatively-low income economies of the time, Ireland in the 1960s had a shortfall in 
each of the sources of labour productivity growth but education does not make much 
difference.  Weaknesses in investment and, especially, total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
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are highlighted as the key problems.1  Table 3 reports that Ireland in 1960 had a low level of 
TFP by European standards.  This appears to have been primarily due to inefficiency rather 
than lack of access to appropriate technology and, moreover, Ireland shows up as inefficient 
relative to its peer group.  Tables 2 and 3 taken together suggest that 1960s Ireland was rather 
slow to address its efficiency gap. 
 
Modern growth economics based on the key concept of endogenous innovation would predict 
that inferior TFP performance would be a consequence of incentive structures, perhaps with 
regard to high direct taxation or inadequate competition, that were less conducive to 
innovation and cost reduction than elsewhere (Aghion and Howitt, 2006).  This suggests that 
supply-side policies left something to be desired and the most plausible culprit is excessive 
protectionism given that Ireland was slow to embrace trade liberalization and had effective 
protection levels that were very high compared with its trading partners until the mid-1960s 
(Barry, 2008).  It is less obvious that Ireland was exposed to unduly high direct taxation 
given that direct tax revenues were only about 12 per cent of GDP. 
 
The diagnosis that T. K. Whitaker offered in 1958 in Economic Development was very much 
along these lines.  He noted that Irish infant industry policies had failed, stressed that lower 
Irish tariffs would increase efficiency and productivity, and argued for the abolition of 
controls on foreign ownership of Irish industry.  He also prioritized a reduction on income 
and profits taxes as a key requirement.  Whitaker emphasized that productive investment was 
too low but his analysis was distinctly not based on the 'capital fundamentalism' that was 
fashionable among economists at the time.  Rather, he argued that the dynamic might be 
found from faster TFP growth which would feedback to investment.2  This is a stance of 
which Aghion and Howitt would approve. 
 
Fully exploiting the potential for catch-up growth also depended on raising investment and 
the rate of capital deepening.  Here, it is important to note an omission in the analysis of 
Economic Development that is highlighted by comparison with high-growth European 
countries.  Eichengreen (2006) argues that, in these economies, state corporatism underwrote 
a co-operative equilibrium between capital and labour that delivered high investment in 
return for wage restraint.3  This was clearly not a path followed by Ireland with its tradition 
of strong but de-centralized collective bargaining (Crouch, 1993). 
 
Whatever the merits of Whitaker's analysis, Ireland's growth performance continued to 
disappoint throughout the Golden Age.  Trade liberalization began, corporate tax reforms 
were introduced and inward technology transfer was encouraged with the new pro-FDI policy 
stance consolidated by the establishment of the Industrial Development Agency in 1969.  But 
                                                 
1 An alternative accounting exercise based on a growth-regression technique points even more strongly in this 
direction, see Crafts and Toniolo (1996) Table 1.14. 
2  Whitaket did not use this terminology but it is clear that the things that he points to as releasing the dynamic 
would show up in a larger Solow residual:  "A dynamic has to be found and it is not necessarily increased 
capital investment, though this may be called for to support a higher rate of development once it is set in 
motion...there are other conditions of economic progress no less important...a raising of the general level of 
education, health and skill, the loosening of restrictive practices, whether of employers or employees, the 
practical encouragement of initiative and enterprise, the adoption of improved methods, techniques and 
principles of organisation and management both in agriculture and industry, and a greater readiness to apply 
scientific advances" (Ireland, Department of Finance, 1958, p.7). 
3 In an Aghion and Howitt-type growth model incentive structures that raise the investment rate also have an 
indirect positive effect on TFP growth. 
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growth regressions performed for the Crafts and Toniolo (2008) survey paper suggests that, if 
anything, Golden-Age Irish under-performance was slightly worse after 1960 than before. 
 
3.  The Transition to the Celtic Tiger  
 
Economic Development clearly pointed the way in that it argued that Ireland must seize the 
opportunities arising from trade liberalization and foreign industrialists coming to Ireland 
would be a vital source of technology transfer.  A recent econometric study concluded that 
income per person in Ireland in 2000 was 25.9 per cent higher than if economic integration 
had remained at its 1950s level (Badinger, 2005).  Moreover, as everyone recognizes, export-
platform foreign direct investment (FDI) was central to transition to fast growth.  Ireland 
became extremely successful in attracting FDI and low corporate taxation was the most 
important reason for this (Gropp and Kostial, 2000).  Beyond this, Ireland developed a 
sophisticated policy framework to select projects for financial support, and made 
complementary investments in education and infrastructure (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). 
 
Table 4 reports estimates of the stock of American FDI per person.  These show that in 1968, 
just before the establishment of the Industrial Development Agency, Ireland was on a par 
with EU countries generally but well below the UK.  In 1986, on the eve of the growth take-
off, Ireland had almost twice as much US FDI per person as the UK and almost 6 times that 
in other EU countries.  By the end of the Celtic Tiger period, the ratios were 3 times and 
almost 9 times, respectively. 
 
FDI increasingly clustered in high-tech sectors associated for example with information 
technology and pharmaceuticals and a quite new revealed comparative emerged based on 
these foreign-owned industries rather than specialization based on Ireland's strengths in 
agriculture, food processing etc. which is what Economic Development envisaged.  This is 
important because trade liberalization might reasonably have been seen as risky for a small 
peripheral economy with industry centralizing in the European core and divergence rather 
than convergence of incomes as can result when economies of scale based on agglomeration 
dominate location decision at intermediate levels of trade costs (Krugman and Venables, 
1990).  In the event, tax advantages were enough to outweigh market-access considerations 
in key sectors with high productivity growth and overcome the dangers of which new 
economic geography warns (Barry, 1996) and regression analysis suggests that the penalty of 
distance from the centre for European income levels halved in the second half of the 20th 
century (Crafts and Toniolo, 2008). 
 
There was, however, more than this to preparing for the Celtic Tiger.  The Social Partnership 
inaugurated in 1987 delivered wage restraint in return for tax cuts and, in some ways 
reminiscent of the Eichengreen hypothesis, the advent of centralized wage bargaining 
promoted investment (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007).  Ireland's late conversion to a social 
contract implied the absence of the corporatist legacy of high taxation and strict regulation 
common elsewhere in 1980's Europe.  Enhanced investment in human capital was also 
apparent − the contribution of human capital deepening to labour productivity growth almost 
doubled to 0.38 percentage points per year in 1970-1990 (Bosworth and Collins, 2003) − and 
this was central to a lower equilibrium level of unemployment (Bergin and Kearney, 2004). 
 
In sum, these developments implied that unemployment could fall dramatically from the 
1987 rate of 17.5 per cent.  Together with the responsiveness of migration flows to faster 
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growth, these developments ensured that Ireland had an elastic labour supply and paved the 
way for rapid employment growth during the Celtic Tiger period.  This implies that catch-up 
growth would be much less vulnerable to diminishing returns to capital accumulation than 
would normally be expected (Barry, 2002).  The implication of this analysis is that the labour 
market matters to the growth process and that malfunctioning of the labour market had been a 
constraint on Irish growth, something which was not really appreciated when Economic 
Development was written in 1958. 
 
4.  The Celtic Tiger from an International Perspective 
 
This idiosyncratic transition path meant that Irish growth during the Celtic Tiger period 
exhibited a number of special features that made it rather unusual compared with its western 
European peer group.  An implication of this is that comparisons of Irish performance need to 
be carefully handled.  It should also be recognized that while the sui−generis nature of Celtic 
Tiger growth does reflect the success of the supply-side policies that Ireland implemented it 
also means that Ireland is not really a role model for others to follow.   
 
It is generally agreed that recent Irish growth is better measured on a GNP− rather than 
GDP−basis because this leaves out the huge flow of repatriated profits of multinational 
companies which are inflated by transfer pricing encouraged by the generous corporate tax 
regime (Cassidy, 2004).4  Ireland is a very trade-oriented economy with exports equal to 101 
per cent of GNP in 2003 and those exports have been concentrated in products whose prices 
have been falling.  The merchandise terms of external trade fell by about 10 per cent between 
1987 and 2003.which means that real national income grew more slowly than real GNP by 
about 1 per cent per year (Crafts, 2005).  This does not detract from the fact that Celtic−Tiger 
growth was remarkable but it does mean that the usual basis for international comparisons, 
namely, real GDP per person exaggerates growth Irish real national income per person by 
about 1.5 percentage points per year. 
 
As was reported in Table 4, Ireland attracted a disproportionate amount of FDI.  A very 
important corollary was that Ireland built up a much bigger ICT−production industry, the 
sector which experienced phenomenal technological progress and productivity growth at this 
time.  Not surprisingly, TFP growth in this sector dominated in the latter part of the Celtic-
Tiger period but it is also the case that TFP growth in the rest of the Irish economy was not 
particularly impressive, although inefficiency levels did fall quite sharply through the 
mid−1990s.5  On the other hand, employment growth was quite spectacular by European 
standards averaging 3.2 per cent per year during 1987 to 2003 compared with population 
growth of 0.7 per cent per year and this was a major reason for rapid per−capita economic 
growth. 
 
In 1987, Ireland was still at the bottom of the western European income−levels league table.  
Over the next 16 years, growth of real GNP per person averaged just over 5.5 per cent per 
year, as Table 5 reports.  This growth rate would have been highly respectable during the 
Golden Age, was easily the highest in Europe in this period, and was more than twice that 
achieved in the other low−income European economies. 
                                                 
4 Accordingly, Tables 5 to 7 use GNP rather than GDP for Ireland. 
5 The estimates in Jerzmanowski (2007), on a similar basis to those reported above in Table 3, show Irish 
efficiency at 0.61 in 1985 and 0.76 in 1995. 
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The sources of this exceptional growth performance and the special features of Irish growth 
can be quantified using growth accounting.  Table 6 shows the standard breakdown for labour 
productivity growth.  Here there are two points to note with regard to comparisons with other 
European countries.  First, while Ireland's labour productivity growth was the highest in 
Europe in this period, it was not nearly as far ahead of the pack as was real GDP per person.  
Second, TFP growth was the highest in Europe and accounted for about three-quarters of 
labour productivity growth whereas the contributions of physical and human capital per 
worker were below the European median. 
 
Table 7 accounts for the sources of output growth rather than productivity growth.  Again, 
two points of comparison with the European peer group are worth highlighting.  First, the 
exceptional contribution made by employment growth stands out.  Only in Spain, where 
labour market reform also played a significant role, is there a remotely similar contribution 
from labour inputs.  Second, unlike Spain, Ireland succeeded in combining a very strong 
contribution from employment growth with a high rate of labour productivity growth, based 
on strong TFP growth.  Tables 6 and 7 also allow comparison of the Celtic Tiger with the 
Asian Tigers.  There is a strong similarity in terms of the contribution from labour inputs 
growth.  But, in other respects, the differences are striking.  Ireland has much superior TFP 
growth but has a much weaker contribution from capital inputs growth than the Asian Tigers 
which have been renowned for their formidable shares of GDP devoted to investment, 
whereas the Irish investment rate over these years averaged just under 20 per cent of GDP. 
 
Finally, Table 8 quantifies the role of TFP growth in the ICT production sector.  It is 
immediately apparent that Ireland was truly exceptional in this regard.6  Even compared with 
Finland, the ICT production sector was very big in Ireland in this period and it is clear that 
TFP growth was dominated by ICT production in Ireland to a much greater extent than 
elsewhere.  This has two important implications which are quite unusual, namely, that TFP 
growth was principally delivered by the technology transfer of multinational companies and 
that a large part of the benefits of this TFP growth accrued to foreigners as it fed into lower 
prices for the exports which comprised the vast majority of the sector's sales. 
 
Ireland's growth during the Celtic−Tiger period was exceptional.  It was driven by FDI and a 
very elastic labour supply.  This reflected the good policy framework that had been 
assembled over the previous thirty years and the much greater openness this entailed.  
However, the implications of openness for growth depend on the specialization that results 
and the productivity growth potential in the exportables sector.  In this Ireland was blessed 
with good luck in terms of the remarkable technological progress which transpired in ICT 
production.  And other countries may not have the same scope for employment to expand in 
response to improved supply-side policy.  So, while Ireland's growth record has lessons for 
other countries and students of endogenous−growth economics, there is a strong sui-generis 
flavour about the Celtic Tiger. 
 
5.  Economic Development Revisited 
 
Economic Development had several important messages which subsequent history has shown 
to be absolutely right.  The basic insight was that if the opportunities of openness were seized 
                                                 
6 The estimates in Table 8 are in terms of GDP and are therefore distorted by the transfer−pricing issue 
discussed earlier.  This clearly affects the detail but not the general thrust of the discussion. 
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independence would be vindicated in economic terms.  The central vision was optimistic and 
rather like that of modern growth economics − establish appropriate incentive structures and 
faster growth would ensue.  The suggestion that the dynamic might come from TFP growth, 
rather than requiring a massive investment, rate was prescient.  And the arguments in favour 
of low corporate taxation and FDI as a key mode of technology transfer pointed to the path to 
the Celtic Tiger that Ireland followed.   
 
Clearly, there was much that Whitaker could not foresee in 1958.  The transformation of Irish 
exports, the way in which the potential disadvantages of peripherality were overcome, and 
the magnitude of the eventual boost to the growth rate must all have been pleasant surprises.  
Moreover, the analysis in Economic Development did not really encompass the 
social−partnership and labour−supply issues that were central to the rapid employment 
growth that was eventually such a distinctive feature of the Celtic Tiger. 
 
The Celtic Tiger was, of course, predicated on globalization.  It is in this context, rather than 
the trade−restrictive and capital−immobile mid−20th century that independence could really 
pay off.  In 1958, it must have seemed that independence had done nothing for Irish 
economic development.  Fifty years later, as Whitaker hoped, that view has clearly been 
refuted.  After all, the key policy instrument which underpinned the transition to fast growth, 
a low corporate tax rate to attract FDI, was an option that would not have been available 
under British rule.   
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Table 1.  Levels and Rate of Growth of Real GDP/Person in Golden Age Europe 
($1990GK and % per year) 
 
 GDP/Person, 1950 GDP/Person, 1973 Growth Rate 
   1950-73 
Switzerland 9064 18204 3.08 
Denmark 6943 13945 3.08 
UK 6939 12025 2.42 
Sweden 6739 12494 3.06 
Netherlands 5971 13081 3.45 
Belgium 5462 12170 3.54 
Norway 5430 11324 3.24 
France 5271 13114 4.04 
West Germany 4281 13153 5.02 
Finland 4253 11085 4.25 
Austria 3706 11235 4.94 
Italy 3502 10634 4.95 
Ireland 3453   6867 3.03 
Spain 2189   7661 5.60 
Portugal 2086   7063 5.45 
Greece 1915   7655 6.21 
 
Note: levels are measured in constant prices at purchasing power parity in 1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars. 
Source: Maddison (2003) 
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Table 2.  Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth, 1960-1970 (% per year) 
 
 Capital- Human-Capital Total Factor Labour 
 Deepening Deepening Productivity Productivity 
Switzerland 1.40 0.40 1.37 3.17 
Denmark 2.15 0.13 1.25 3.53 
UK 1.45 0.17 1.24 2.86 
Sweden 1.34 0.19 2.40 3.93 
Netherlands 1.43 0.74 0.89 3.06 
Belgium 1.36 0.42 2.33 4.11 
Norway 1.18 0.48 1.80 3.46 
France 2.02 0.29 2.62 4.93 
West Germany 2.10 0.23 2.03 4.36 
Finland 1.66 0.37 2.64 4.67 
Austria 2.39 0.18 2.90 5.47 
Italy 2.39 0.36 3.50 6.25 
Ireland 1.78 0.22 2.21 4.21 
Spain 2.45 0.38 3.73 6.56 
Portugal 2.05 0.35 3.99 6.39 
Greece 3.63 0.26 4.45 8.34 
 
Note: estimates based on the standard neoclassical growth accounting formula with imposed 
capital share of 0.35 in all cases; capital-deepening reflects the contribution of investment, 
human-capital deepening denotes the contribution of improved educational attainment of the 
labour force, and total factor productivity captures the contribution of improvements in 
efficiency and technology. 
Source: database constructed for Bosworth and Collins (2003) kindly provided by the 
authors. 
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Table 3.  Decomposition of 1960 TFP Level into Efficiency and Technology Components 
(USA = 1.00) 
 
 TFP Efficiency Technology 
Switzerland 1.05 1.00 1.05 
Denmark 0.69 0.68 1.01 
UK 0.85 0.89 0.95 
Sweden 0.73 0.72 1.01 
Netherlands 0.77 0.74 1.04 
Belgium 0.65 0.64 1.01 
Norway 0.54 0.63 0.86 
France 0.72 0.71 1.01 
Finland 0.62 0.60 1.04 
Austria 0.60 0.64 0.94 
Italy 0.67 0.71 0.94 
Ireland 0.51 0.55 0.93 
Spain 0.64 0.74 0.86 
Portugal 0.57 0.66 0.87 
Greece 0.49 0.57 0.86 
 
Note: TFP = Efficiency*Technology 
Source: Jerzmanowski (2007). 
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Table 4.  Inward US FDI Stock/Person ($) 
 
 Ireland UK Rest of EU15 
1968       42.9   120.2     39.6 
1986   1241.2   628.4   212.6 
1995   2212.5 1819.9   601.3 
2003 14134.3 4536.8 1616.6 
 
Note: measured at historic cost 
Source: US, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Table 5.  Levels and Rate of Growth of Real GDP/Person during the Celtic Tiger Period 
($1990GK and % per year) 
 
 GDP/Person, 1987 GDP/Person, 2003 Growth Rate 
   1987-2003 
Switzerland 19792 22267 0.75 
Norway 18164 25871 2.24 
Denmark 18023 23080 1.56 
Sweden 16949 21462 1.49 
France 16553 21417 1.63 
Germany 16010 19071 1.27 
Netherlands 15639 22237 2.22 
Belgium 15541 21206 1.96 
UK 15393 21415 2.09 
Finland 15382 20849 1.92 
Austria 15313 21141 2.04 
Italy 14946 19091 1.55 
Spain 10520 16169 2.72 
Greece   9375 13696 2.40 
Portugal   9185 13904 2.63 
Ireland   8809 20792 5.53 
 
Notes: Germany is for 1989 to 2003, Ireland is GNP/Person. 
Source: GGDC (2008). 
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Table 6.  Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth, 1990-2003 (% per year) 
 
 Capital Human-Capital Total Factor Labour 
 Deepening Deepening Productivity Productivity 
Switzerland 0.60 0.08 −0.23 0.45 
Norway 0.31 0.21 1.81 2.33 
Denmark 0.72 0.19 0.95 1.86 
Sweden 0.73 0.44 1.16 2.33 
France 0.58 0.27 0.13 0.98 
Germany 0.76 0.17 0.60 1.53 
Netherlands 0.26 0.28 0.07 0.61 
Belgium 0.76 0.25 0.26 1.27 
UK 0.91 0.41 0.74 2.06 
Finland 0.49 0.31 1.49 2.29 
Austria 0.86 0.27 0.37 1.50 
Italy 0.60 0.38 0.14 1.12 
Spain 0.63 0.37 −0.37 0.63 
Greece 0.61 0.35 1.25 2.21 
Portugal 1.13 0.47 −0.31 1.29 
Ireland 0.49 0.26 2.24 2.99 
     
Singapore 1.76 0.85 0.90 3.51 
South Korea 2.40 0.50 0.91 3.81 
Taiwan 2.67 0.40 1.69 4.76 
 
Note: Ireland adjusted to GNP basis. 
Source: update of database constructed for Bosworth and Collins (2003) kindly provided by 
authors. 
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Table 7.  Contributions to Real GDP Growth, 1990-2003 (% per year) 
 
 Due to Capital Due to Labour Total Factor Real GDP 
   Productivity Growth 
Switzerland 0.75 0.35 −0.23 0.87 
Norway 0.62 0.78 1.81 3.21 
Denmark 0.78 0.29 0.95 2.02 
Sweden 0.57 0.15 1.16 1.88 
France 0.84 0.75 0.13 1.72 
Germany 0.77 0.18 0.60 1.55 
Netherlands 1.19 1.01 0.07 2.27 
Belgium 0.96 0.63 0.26 1.85 
UK 0.99 0.57 0.74 2.30 
Finland 0.33 0.02 1.49 1.84 
Austria 1.05 0.63 0.37 2.05 
Italy 0.70 0.57 0.14 1.41 
Spain 1.33 1.66 −0.37 2.62 
Greece 0.79 0.69 1.25 2.73 
Portugal 1.45 1.06 −0.31 2.20 
Ireland 1.75 2.45 2.24 6.44 
     
Singapore 2.62 2.45 0.90 5.97 
South Korea 3.08 1.75 0.91 5.74 
Taiwan 3.22 1.43 1.69 6.34 
 
Notes: Ireland adjusted to GNP basis; contribution of human capital included in labour. 
Source: update of database constructed for Bosworth and Collins (2003) kindly provided by 
authors. 
 15
Table 8.  Decomposition of TFP Growth (% per year) 
 
 Finland Ireland EU USA 
1990-1995     
TFP Growth 1.23   2.96 1.12 0.61 
   From ICT production 0.16   1.17 0.14 0.25 
   Other 1.07   1.79 0.98 0.36 
     
Memo Item     
   ICT Domar Weight 2.61 11.73 1.50 2.63 
     
1995-2001     
TFP Growth 2.67   3.61 0.46 0.80 
   From ICT Production 0.69   3.62 0.27 0.44 
   Other 1.98 −0.01 0.19 0.36 
     
Memo Item     
   ICT Domar Weight 8.26 22.56 2.07 2.96 
 
Notes: ICT Domar Weight is gross output of ICT/GDP (%); EU excludes Belgium, Greece 
and Luxembourg in 1990-95 and excludes Luxembourg in 1995-2001 
Sources: van Ark et al. (2003) and Timmer and van Ark (2005). 
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